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C re d ib ility  and th e  V alu e  o f In form ation  
T ransm ission  in a M o d el o f M o n eta ry  P o licy  
and Inflation
Tamer Ba§ar' and Mark Salm on2
Abstract
In this paper we solve for the optimal (Stackelberg) policy in a model of credibility and 
monetary policy developed by Cukierman and Meltzer (1986). Unlike the (Nash) solution 
provided by Cukierman and Meltzer, the dynamic optimization problem facing the monetary 
authority in this case is not of a linear quadratic form and certainty equivalence does not 
apply. The learning behavior of the private sector (regarding the policy maker’s preferences) 
becomes intimately linked with the choice of the optimal policy and cannot be separated as 
in the certainty equivalent case. Once the dual effect of the optimal Stackelberg policy is 
recognized the monetary authority has an additional channel of influence to consider beyond 
that taken into account by suboptimal certainty equivalent Nash policy rules. Unlike Nash 
behavior the Stackelberg solution implies no inflationary bias, while being still (weakly) time- 
consistent. This makes the Stackelberg solution credible with only stagewise precommitment 
of the policy maker. In the absence of such a precommitment, learning behavior of the private 
sector does not sufficiently inhibit the incentive of the monetary authority to cheat in this 
model despite the fact that this learning is explicitly recognized in the Stackelberg solution.
C oo rd in a ted  Science Laboratory, University of Illinois, 1101 W. Springfield Avenue, Urbana, IL 
61801/USA



























































































1 In t r o d u c t io n
The question of how optimal economic policy should be constructed when the private 
sector forms rational expectations has been a central issue in macroeconomics ever since 
Lucas (1976) emphasized the endogenity of rational expectations. The standard approach to 
this problem, following Kydland and Prescott (1977), has been to formulate the underlying 
decision process as a Nash game, which leads naturally to a (Weakly) time consistent solution 
at the expense of removing the strategic dominance of the policy maker. An asymmetric 
(Stackelberg) solution that exploits this strategic dominance will however invariably lead 
to a better performance for the policy maker than what he would achieve under the Nash 
solution. Thus, while the possible time inconsistency of the Stackelberg solution and the 
presence of an incentive for the leader to renege may be seen as undesirable, there is also a 
credibility issue associated with the time consistent Nash solution, particularly if the follower 
also benefits from the leadership of the policy maker. Hence the standard argument that the 
Nash solution is the only meaningful resolution to such policy issues, without recourse to 
some exogeneous precommitment, is called into question. This is more so if the Stackelberg 
solution is also weakly time consistent, which means that with only stagewise (instantaneous) 
precommitment there is no incentive for the policy maker to renege.
In this paper we study these issues in the context of a specific stochastic model of mon­
etary policy and inflation developed by Cukierman and Meltzer (1986) who extended the 
earlier repeated game analysis of Barro and Gordon (1983). This dynamic model incorpo­
rates asymmetric information between the private sector and the monetary authority, which 
brings forth the impact of learning as an issue of major importance in the construction of 
the optimal policy. Cukierman and Meltzer develop a (certainty equivalent) Nash solution 
to this policy problem in which each side takes the other’s reaction, the policy rule and 
rational expectation respectively, as given. However this Nash solution, not only generates 
a suboptimal policy for the monetary authority, as emphasized above, but one that ignores 
critical aspects of information transmission and learning. In what follows we develop the 
optimal (Stackelberg) policy for the monetary authority that retains the natural asymmetry 
inherent in the problem, that will be credible with some prior commitment. The optimal 
policy is furthermore (weakly) time consistent, which is perhaps surprising in view of the 
well-acknowledged fact that Stackelberg solutions are generically time inconsistent (see, for 
example, Ba§ar and Olsder (1982)). We show how the optimal policy is determined from a 
nonquadratic optimization problem for which certainty equivalence does not apply. The dual 
control aspect of this optimal policy is reflected in the recognition by the monetary authority 
that it may simultaneously influence the weight the private sector places on its most recent 
information, when updating its rational expectation of the policy maker’s preference, as well 
as the information itself that is available to the private sector. In this way the policy maker 
is fully aware of the impact of his policy action on his reputation when he selects his optimal 
policy action.
Solutions to nonfinite state dual control problems are well recognized to be typically 




























































































ably required in order to derive computationally tractable, albeit suboptimal, decision rules. 
Here, however, we make no such assumptions for the solution of the underlying dual con­
trol problem. Proceeding in stages towards an understanding of the optimal policy, we first 
discuss the model and alternative solution concepts and then derive a Nash solution for a 
two period version of the problem. Then we compare this certainty equivalent Nash solution 
with the Stackelberg solution under the restriction of certainty equivalence, before providing 
the optimal (unrestricted) Stackelberg solution for the two-period problem which captures 
the essential economic issues raised by information transfer through choice of policy. The 
complete Stackelberg solutions to the general finite-horizon and infinite-horizon problems are 
also provided in the paper, but without giving details of their derivation as they are highly 
involved mathematically (for details, see Ba§ar (1988)). Finally we discuss aspects of time 
consistency and credibility of these solutions before concluding the paper.
2 T h e  m o d e l a n d  d iffe re n t e q u ilib r iu m  c o n c e p ts
The basic model we adopt is that used by Cukierman and Meltzer (1986), but instead of 
taking an infinite horizon we assume here that the monetary authority faces a finite horizon 
policy optimization problem with objective function of the form,
J  = e  (1)
where the policy instrument is the planned rated of monetary growth, mf. The private sector 
is only able to observe m,-, the actual rate of monetary growth which results after mp has 
been affected by the random shock fa associated with imperfect monetary control;
mi = mpi+  fa fa ~  N(0, c \)  i = 0 ,1 ,... (2)
The shocks {</>,-} are taken to be zero mean Gaussian random variables, which are serially 
uncorrelated and have a fixed variance of <jJ.
The private sector is assumed to act as a “passive” decision maker which simply forms 
conditional expectations of the actual rate of monetary growth, given the observed history 
of past growth;
Ii = (3)
That is, letting d,- denote the forecast of the private sector at time i, and the mechanism 
by which rational expectations are generated, we have
di = ¡¡(It) = E[mi\Ii], i = 0 ,1 ,2 ... (4)
The monetary surprise, e,-, is given by




























































































where the last relation follows from (2) and the assumption that {ipi} forms an independent 
sequence.
The variable x, in (1) is the preference parameter of the monetary authority which trades 
off the benefit from stimulating the economy through the monetary surprise, with the loss 
from increased inflation in period i. This basic preference parameter of the monetary au­
thority which is unknown to the private sector, is stochastic and assumed to change over 
time with both permanent and transitory components, leading to what is effectively the state 
equation for the policy optimization problem;
Xi = p x ^  + A(1 — p) + vt (6)
with Vi ~  yV(0,<T̂ ), ¿ =  1 ,2 ,..., and x0 ~  N (x0, tr* ). Here again, {u,} is a sequence of zero 
mean serially uncorrelated Gaussian random variables with fixed variance <rj, which are also 
independent of the shocks { } .  The random variable x0 is also an independent Gaussian 
random variable, with mean So and variance criL, representing the prior beliefs of the private 
sector. The monetary authority constructs its optimal policy based on a knowledge of its 
current and past preferences as well as So in general we seek a sequence of policy rules 
{7;} of the form,
m* = -uiVi), Vi = {x i-i,'x i-i,.........x0 ,/,}• (T)
Note the asymmetric form of the information structure between the monetary authority 
and the private sector, which enables the monetary authority to solve the private sector's 
prediction problem, which it will in fact do as part of the exercise when designing its optimal 
monetary policy.
An important feature of the formulation above is the presence of asymmetry not only 
in the information structure but also in the way the decision makers affect the decision 
process. The private sector’s only role is to form conditional expectations, which however 
depend critically on the policy rules of the monetary authority. To indicate this dependence 
explicitly we introduce the notation
S = / ( 7) (3)
where 6 = {i, }i^0, 7 = {7;}£0- Hence, in compact notation, the policy optimization problem 
faced by the monetary authority is
max J (7 , / ( 7)) = J (7 * ,/(7 *)) (9)
where the function J  is defined by (1), and the maximization is over all possible policies 7 . 
The policy optimization problem (9) captures the general form of all similar problems where 
the cost function, J, does not necessarily have to be in the form (1) but where /  is always the 
conditional expectation operator which determines the forecast rule for the passive player. 
Under the adopted behavioral assumptions the maximum in (9) is the best performance the 





























































































Cukierman and Meltzer (1986) instead obtained a different type of solution for the prob­
lem. Their interest was on the characterization of a policy, 7 , for the monetary authority 
with the property that
max J (7 , / ( 7 )) = J ( 7 , / ( 7 )). (10)
There may exists multiple 7 ’s (linear and nonlinear) that satisfy the above relationship (10), 
and it may be difficult (if not impossible) to obtain the entire set of such solutions.3 This, 
in turn, makes it impossible to determine the “best” policy within this set and even if such 
a solution exists it will in general be different from 7 * and hence lead to an inferior overall 
performance for the policy maker.
It can be readily seen that (9) and (10) represent the Stackelberg and Nash solutions 
if the problem were set up as a dynamic game with the private sector being treated as a 
strategic player where the forecast rules are regarded as strategic variables. Toward this 
end we may consider the two person nonzero-sum dynamic game with the objective functions 
Ji and J2,
J i h J )  = J(rr,S) (11«)
J2(7 ,i) = - B { E ( i . ( / , ) - ^ ) 2c.] (116)
where 7 is the composite policy rule of player 1 (the monetary authority) who strives to 
maximize J l5 and 8 is the composite decision rule of player 2 (the private sector) who wishes 
to minimize J2, with the q ’s taken as positive weighting terms.
In the case of the Stackelberg game, we now make the useful observation that.the objective 
function (1) can equivalently be written as
J  = E j i > [ ( * ,  -  E[x|/ ,-]K  -  5 K ) 2]} (12)
which made use of the expression for ei as given by (5) and the nestedness property of 
conditional expectations:
E{E[m?t |/,)z,} =
= £ { £ K |/ ,]£ [ :r , |/ i]}
= E{m^E[x, |/,]}.
Note that the above implies that the leader’s Stackelberg policy 7 * is also a Stackelberg 
policy for him in the game where the objective functions (11 a,)—(1 lb) are replaced by
Jr(7 ,i) = E  { £ > 1 (2 ; -  > / ; ) K  -  5 K ) 2] j  (13a)
For the specific problem a t hand, it can in fact be shown that this equilibrium is unique in the class of 




























































































(13 b)J 2(7 ,5) = £ { b W ) - z.52c.}
where 8 is the decision rule of player 2 (private sector) who wishes to minimize that is 
to obtain the best estimate of government’s preference parameter, X{, at each stage of the 
decision process. Such an equivalence between the two formulations does not carry over to 
the Nash game, that is the Nash solution for the original game will be different from the 
Nash solution of a game with objective functions (13a)-(13b).
3 T h e  N a s h  so lu tio n  fo r a  tw o -p e r io d  p ro b le m
Consider the two-period version of the dynamic game problem of section 2, with the cost 
functions for the two players given by (11a) and (lib), with N = 1. To determine a Nash 
equilibrium we need to find strategies 7  = (70, 71) for the government and forecast functions 
8 = (80, 8i) for the private sector which satisfy the inequalities
> J i (7 ,<5) for all permissible 7
^2(7 ,8) < J2(j, 8) for all permissible 8 .
The following theorem provides such a solution for this two-period problem.
Theorem  (Nash):
(i) A Nash equilibrium solution for the two-period problem formulated above is given by; 
mi =  7i(zi) = ®i; mo = 7o(zo) = M x 0 +  k 
*- M 2<j1
81 (mo) = E[ml\m0] = M  px0 + p
M ^ xo+ a l (m0 -  M x0 -  k) + MA(1 -  p) (15)
= E[m0] = M x  0 + k
where M  is a real solution to the third-order polynomial equation;
M = l -
M *o*.+ *l
(16)
and k is given by
_  A(1 -  p)pPMa2m
+ 4  '
(ii) The Nash equilibrium above is unique if either 81 or 70 is restricted to the class ot 




























































































Proof: The proof is omitted to conserve space but is presented in the fuller version of this 
paper which is available from the authors. O
By the nature of Nash equilibrium, in determining the optimal policy parameter M, the 
reaction of the private sector is not taken into account, unlike the Stackelberg case to be 
studied below. In effect the Nash solution is determined by the mutual consistency of two 
single player, certainty equivalent, optimization problems where the reaction of the other 
player is taken as given. Hence we refer to this Nash solution as individually certainty 
equivalent since the optimal decisions for the two players do not reflect the potential for dual 
control action. Furthermore the Nash solution above is only weakly, and not strongly, 
tim e consistent, using the terminology of Ba§ar (1989).
The two period Nash solution presented above can be extended to the N  period case (see 
Ba§ar and Salmon (1989b)) and then to a stationary solution that coincides with the solution 
to the infinite horizon problem considered by Cukierman and Meltzer. The advantage of 
taking a finite horizon lies in the use of the Kalman filter to model the private sector’s (state) 
learning and expectation formation process which, as we shall see, allows the possibility to 
monitor the evolution of credibility both in steady state and during the important transient 
phase of adjustment to the steady state. Whereas Cukierman and Meltzer, by adopting 
an infinite horizon and a Wiener filter to solve the private sector’s prediction problem, 
are restricted to only consider credibility in steady state. In either case, in this weakly
time-consistent Nash equilibrium the level of credibility at any time is determined only by
structural parameters of the model, and not by the policy.
The distribution of monetary growth and hence the nonzero value of inflationary bias 
evolve over time; so that
' E[m0] = M x0 + k, var[m0] -  M 2al0 + (17a)
E[i-ni] = A, varlm-t] = (1 -  p2)-1^  + a \. (176)
In Ba§ar and Salmon (1989b) we show how the distribution of monetary growth in a finite 
horizon converges to the stationary solution given in Cukierman and Meltzer (1986).
4 T h e  m y o p ic  S ta c k e lb e rg  s o lu tio n
We now turn to the Stackelberg formulation of the decision problem and assume first 
that the monetary authority acts myopically in that it only recognizes that it affects the 
information set available to the private sector in the following period through its decision 
today. Under this assumption the optimization problem (12) becomes one with a Linear 




























































































into that of determining a sequence of static decisions, each one of which solves uniquely
maxmp=7.(,., E{{xi -  £[x;|7t])m? -  Km?)2} = \E {(xi -  £[xiff;])2}
m? =  = x i ~  E[xi\Ii}  =  x ( -
Here the optimal prediction (rational expectation) by the private sector of the mone­
tary authority’s preference, is generated by the Kalman filter:
+  A ( l  -  p), ¿01-1 =  -E[xol ■= x 0
x i\i =  Xi|,-1 +  T<7., 1 + 0* 
tfi+ih = A *  +
j(m ; -m,-I;.!)
a i\i =  ~2----- T T ? ! ^Ol-l =  var (z 0) =  <7I0-
+ av
Notice also that
rhiIM := £{m?|/,} =  £{(*,- -  E[x,\I,])\I,} = 0,
so given the myopic policy and the structure of the model the best conditional forecast 
that the private sector can make of the next period’s monetary growth is zero. Hence 
every observation on monetary growth represents an observation on the innovation process 
driving the Kalman Filter. This follows directly from the form of the policy rule under the 
assumption of myopic decision making.
Substituting this myopic policy back into the objective function, we find
max J  > E { £  \ n Xi -  £ [x ,|/;])2} = £
which provides a lower bound on the performance attainable under the optimal (nonmyopic) 
policy.
Comparing this myopic certainty equivalent solution with that derived under the Nash 
assumption in the previous section we can see that, as in the commitment (or rules) solution 
of Barro and Gordon (1983), there is no inflationary bias, whereas in the Nash (or discre­
tionary) solution the bias is given by (17). The distribution of monetary growth in this case 
implies, for each i,



























































































5 T h e  o p tim a l S ta c k e lb e rg  p o lic y  fo r th e  tw o -p e r io d  
p ro b le m
In the previous section we obtained a lower bound for the optimal performance in the 
Stackelberg game, and so we know that the optimal policy will satisfy
max J  > E7o ,—nw t=0 z
■ £t|»Vl) = L——m ax  •
The question now becomes whether we can find a sequence of policies {70, • •. , 7n } which 
maximizes J  and whether max J > J max. We approach this problem in this section by 
solving for the optimal policy in a two-period problem in which the dual effect is now 
formally recognized.
Consider the problem of maximizing the objective function (12), with N = l:
J = E \  Y^ß'{xi -  E[xi\Ii])m^ -  1/3'I
For the last period, i =  1, there will be no issue of information transmission and so the 
optimal policy will be given by the myopic solution developed in section 4. So the solution 
will be
mi = 7i(I?i) -  *1 -  E[xi|/i].
Now we need to consider the optimal policy for period 0 taking into account the full effect 
of the information transmission to period 1. The cost function for the two period problem 
can then be written, having substituted the optimal policy rule for the final period, as
j l /?^1 -  £[zi|A])2 + (Zo -  E [x0\I a})ml -  l(mg)2 j  .max J0 = max Emj.mf mg
But, given that
A = m0 = ml + V>o,
we may rewrite the innovation in period 1 as
xx -  £7[a.-, |/,] = p(x0 -  E[xQ\mv0 + i/>0]) + v0
so the cost function becomes
max J 0 =  -/3<r2 + maxE  [ -p 20{xo -  E[x0\mo + i/>0])2 +  (x0 -  E[x0\I0})ml
which may be written in terms of the yet unknown policy rule 70
maxp J0 = -/3<t2 + max F( j 0)




























































































where F(jo) is the maximand on the right hand side of (19). The difficulty in solving this 
problem lies as discussed earlier in that the optimal policy in the initial period, mg, is part 
of the conditioning information when the private sector’s expectation of monetary growth 
(or the preference parameter) is taken in period 1. The way we solve the problem below is 
to simultaneously solve for the optimal predictor for the private sector in period 1, 5(1), and 
the optimal policy rule for the government in period 0, say 7 . Since we know that the private 
sector’s forecast function will depend on the government’s policy rule and the government’s 
optimal policy rule will depend on the private sector’s forecast function, we need to examine 
the fixed points of the mappings ¿[7 ] and 7 (1$] where in addition it should be stressed that 
in this Stackelberg solution 5 is a different mapping for each 7 and vice versa.
Substituting the unknown predictor function into the objective function we first define
G(5,7 ) := E { \ y m h )  -  *o)2 + (xo -  E(x0\I0})ml -  i(m£)2} (20)
where
mpa = 7 (^o, lo), h  — mo + $0
noting that the information set Io will be empty. The “policy problem” facing the private 
sector is to minimize its prediction error through its choice of 5 and the monetary authority 
recognizing this will solve the following problem in order to determine its optimal 7 , chosen 
so as to maximize the prediction error.
m ax/’(7 ) = max min G(5,7 ). 
1  1  Hi)
( 2 1 )
We next show that the function G in fact admits a unique saddle point, that is there exists 
a unique pair of policies (¿*,7 *) such that
(?(£*, 7 *) =  max rnin G(5,~f) = min max G(5,~i)
or alternatively,
G (i*,7)<G (d*,7*)<G (d,7 ')-
Clearly given any saddle-point pair (5", 7 *) we have from (21) that
( 2 2 )
F (7 *) = maxi?(7 ) (23)
and furthermore 7 * is the unique maximizing solution above if (<5*, 7*) is unique as a saddle 
point solution.
Before presenting the main result of this section, we first introduce some notation.
Let L = Lo be a real solution to the polynomial equation
1 - L l
Laloalp20





























































































and let K0 be given by
(25)Ko =
Furthermore introduce the function
Loci
(Ll< + 4 )
s A ( io ) .
for
r (/0  = (1 -  A V I) 
(1 -  A'V/?)
K 2 + l/p 2P,
and the condition




(i) The polynomial equation (24) is identical with L = F(A(L)), and admits a maximizing 
real solution L0, with 0 < Lo < 1.
(ii) If L0 satisfies (27), the game G admits the unique saddle point solution
£*(/i) — xq + K q I\ = x o  + A ( i0)A
7*(a;0) = Lo(x0 -  x0) = T(K0)(x0 -  x0)
where 7 * also provides the unique solution of (23).
(iii) Condition (27) can equivalently be written as




(i) Existence of Lo follows from the simple observation that since (24) is a 5“  order 
polynomial it will admit one, three or five real solutions. Furthermore, all these solutions 
will lie in the open interval (0,1) since g(L) is nonnegative and is zero only if L = 0. If the 
polynomial has more than one real root, let L0 be the one that provides the largest value of 
^ (7 ) defined following (19). If there is more than one such solution then Lo could be taken 
to be any one of them which we refer to as a maximizing solution of (24). The fact that (24) 
is identical with the equation F(A(i)) = L follows from the substitution of (25) into (26).
(ii) Here we verify the pair of inequalities (22). The right hand side follows since 6(5,7), 
given by (20), is miminized for any 7 by the conditional mean of x0 (given Ix), and when 
7 = 7 *, this conditional mean is linear in L as given. For the left hand side inequality, note 
that G(<5*, 7 ) is a quadratic function of 7 , with the coefficient of the quadratic term being
1  f ,  _  ¿ 0 \




























































































The condition a < 0 directly implies that G(S*, 7 ) is a strictly concave function of 7 , and 
being quadratic, it admits a unique solution which is
7(̂ 0) = r(A(Lo))(* -  x0)
and by (i)
7 (x0) = L0(x -  x0).
This verifies the left hand side of the inequality (22), under the condition a < 0. Using the 
fact that ¿0 satisfies (24), a can be simplified to
01 — ,g(£o(l — i-o)((Tl0/ ai)  ~  1)
and hence the concavity condition is indeed equivalent to (27). Note that under this con­
dition, G(<5*,7) admits a unique maximum, and using the interchangeability property of 
multiple saddle-point equilibria [Ba§ar and Olsder, (1982)] it readily follows that (28) is in­
deed the unique saddle point solution of G under (27), which also means that the maximizing 
solution alluded to in part (i) will have to be unique under condition (27).
(iii) This follows readily by noting that
a = -1 (1  -  A(T0)V/?),
and hence the condition a < 0 is equivalent to (29). O
The condition (27) of the Lemma is given in terms of the solution of (24), and this depends 
on the parameters of the problem only implicitly. A more explicit dependence purely on the 
parameters *lo, <7 ,̂, p and /3 can be seen in the condition
< 4<4 _ (30)
which implies (27). 
equivalent to
but since




LWxA qP2P _  aloP2P
(11*1 + H
the preceding inequality is always satisfied under (30).
Condition (30), or the less restrictive (27), are sufficient for the linear solution 7 * given in 
the Lemma to be overall maximizing, but there is no indication that is is also necessary. In 
fact, it is quite plausible that the result is valid for all values of the parameters defining the 




























































































saddle point (that is the upper value is strictly larger that the lower value); however, this 
does not rule out the possibility that the maximizing solution for F(7 ) is still linear.
If we restrict the monetary authority to affine policies at the outset, say of the special 
form
7(x0) = L(x0 -  x0),
then
E{xa -  xQ\m0 = L(x0 -  x0) + rpo\
and substituting this into F(7 ) we obtain
^°xo mo
(¿2<  +
r,/ r , > , 2 , 1 ! ,  1 p2/3Z,2(cr| )2F (7 = L0(xo -  *o)) = F(L) = ~{crv + p axo) -  -  j-2 + +  ¿O’2
as the function to be maximized over the scalar L. Being continuous and bounded above. F 
admits a maximum, and differentiating it with respect to L and setting the derivative equal 
to zero we obtain the equation
. T L a i y y p  
(£2<  + *IY
which is (24). Hence the affine policy 7 * given in the lemma is optimal for all values of the 
parameters if the search is restricted to the linear class.
The lemma above can now be used to provide the following unique solution to the two- 
period Stackelberg problem.
Theorem (Stackelberg)
(i) The unique Stackelberg solution to two-period version of the problem of section 2, 
with the objective functions (11 a)—(lib) is
mi = -ilivi) = x i -  Xqoi rnl = 7 *(i?0) = L0{x0 -  x0) (31a)
5* (m0) =  <5J =  0 (316)
where Lg is obtained as the unique solution to (24), under condition (27), and
Xj|o :=  E[xi\mo = 7j(?70) +  t/>o] =  pxa + A{\ -  p) + I<0m0. (31c)
(ii) The solution above is unique even in the absence of condition (27) if the policies of 
either decision maker are restricted to be affine.
(iii) If the objective functions are instead taken (equivalently) to be given by (13a)—(13b), 
the unique Stackelberg solution is still given as above, with only the private sector’s optimal 
decision changed to




























































































where it now forecasts the policy maker’s preference parameter. The optimum performance 
indices in the two cases are the same. □
The essential difference between the dual solution above and the certainty equivalent 
solution presented in section 4 lies in that although the policy is still linear in the innovation 
or forecast error of the private sector (with regard to the policy maker’s preference parame­
ters), the optimal policy parameter Lo now lies in the range (0,1). Moreover in the solution 
process the value of Lo has been chosen taking into account the feedback from the effect 
on the private sector’s expectation formation process in period 0. In particular the effect 
of Lo on the Kalman gain, K0 = A (Lo) determines the weight attached to the most recent, 
information and in effect the policy maker’s credibility. Thus the.monetary authority has 
the ability to directly affect his own credibility with his choice of monetary growth rate by- 
modifying the way in which the private sector forms its rational expectation. Moreover this 
can be achieved without recourse to an additional policy instrument, for instance a i, as in 
the Cukierman and Meltzer (19S6)’s (section 6) analysis of ambiguity.
We notice that as in the myopic certainty equivalent solution there is no inflationary 
bias induced by the optimal policy but the variance of moneary growth is increased over 
that in the certainty equivalent case. This point and those that follow will be made more 
apparent if we consider briefly the steady state solution of this optimization problem, which 
is done in the next section. But before concluding this section it is also worth pointing to an 
important property of the Stackelberg solution presented in the theorem, that of weak time 
consistency. This is not a feature that Stackelberg solutions generally enjoy, unless they 
are constructed under the explicit assumption of time consistency (which leads to feedback 
or stagewise Stackelberg equilibrium, generally inferior to the global Stackelberg solution; 
see Basjar and Olsder (1982)); here, however, the unrestricted solution is also weakly time 
consistent (a la Ba§ar (1989)) meaning (in this case) that the policies qj1 and also provide a 
Stackelberg solution to the static (last stage) Stackelberg game, using the objective functions 
(11 a)—(lib) with 70 and S0 taken at their optimum values, Jo and ¿o> respectively. We shall 
observe a more general version of this feature in the next section, for both the general finite 
horizon and infinite horizon versions of the problem.
6 T h e  S ta c k e lb e rg  so lu tio n  fo r th e  f in ite  a n d  in fin ite  
h o r iz o n  p ro b le m s  a n d  th e  issu e  o f  t im e  c o n s is te n c y
For the general finite-horizon problem, consider the following policy for the government:
m f = 7i(ru} m Li{xi -  % _ i), i = 0 ,1 ,... (32)
where is the Kalman predictor generated recursively under the policy choice (32):
=  P*i\i-1 +  -A(l -  P), (33a)
L  ^
i,-|i =  l| ,~ 1— — (m i -  ra.|.-i) (33A)
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as the function to the maximized subject to the dynamic constraint (33c)—(33d), to determine 
the optimum values for the government’s policy parameters Lo, ¿ 1, •. ■, £/v- It has been 
shown by Ba§ar (1988) that this optimal control problem admits a solution, obtainable 
using dynamic programming, and that the structural restriction (32) does not bring in any 
loss of generality to the policy optimization. In other words, the government’s Stackelberg 
policy is given by (32), with the £ ,’s determined (implicitly) from the dynamic program:
Wi(af) = max 
L i
P2a2i° l 
L W  +  c\
* =  JV, JV — 1.......0 (35)
WjV+l(°AM-l) ~  3
where of = <r20, and of := of,.. For the infinite horizon problem (i.e., as N  —> oo), the 
Stackelberg solution again exists, and is given by the stationary policy (see Ba§ar (1988))
itiVi) = L{xi -  i,-|;_i),i = n ,n  + 1, . . .
where L is a constant, lying in the interval (0,1), determined from
W ( ä 2) P ° °






provided that n is sufficiently far away from zero. Here <r2 is the steady-state forecast error 
covarince (i.e., the limit of of+1|; given by (33c) as i —> oo, and with N —> oo), and when 
L is considered as a variable in (37b) one can show that the derivation of a2 with respect 
to £2 is negative. Hence, one effect of the optimal policy in the dual problem having a 
gain coefficient in (36) less than one is to increase the variability of moneary growth when 
compared with the myopic solution.
It is ambigious whether the steady state Kalman gain (in (33b)) will be an increasing 
or decreasing function of L, when L is again considered as a variable, but it can be seen 
from the objective function (34) (with N —> oo and L; = L) that the government selects 




























































































trades off the effects on the two (multiplicative) components (L — \Lfi) and 0f|,_r  The first 
can be seen to be maximized when L = 1 as in the myopic solution, and the second, being a 
decreasing function of L2, is maximized at zero. Hence there will be an optimal policy and a 
corresponding level of informational credibility that trades off the benefits from surprises and 
the costs of inflation that reflects the government’s ability to control the extent of surprise.
For both the finite and infinite horizon problems, the 8’’s are again zero, implying that 
there is no inflationary bias. The fact that the optimal policy (of the government) is con­
structed using a dynamic program, again implies weak time consistency, weak because the 
future is not completely decoupled from the past, the coupling being through the current 
(optimal) value of the forecast error covariance To give a precise mathematical descrip­
tion for this important feature, let 7 := {7i}(l0, 6 := 7(n) :=‘{7 »}i=», ¿(n) := {6;}"=o7
7 V1) := {7 .}^„. := {¿¡}(Y.n, where N  may also be taken to be infinity, to capture the
infinite-horizon problem as well. Then, if 7 * is the Stackelberg solution (32) (or (36)) for the 
government, as discussed above, and S’ is the corresponding forecast policy of the private 
sector (which is identically zero), for any n, the pair (7 '"'*, 6 ^ ’) solves the Stackelberg game 
with objective functions
M 7 (n>,7(n>; S(n>.S(n)), J2(7 w , 7(»)i s(ni, 6fn)),
which is the (truncated) game derived from the original decision problem, with j(„) and ¿¡n) 
fixed at their optimal values. Note that this is a property enjoyed by the feedback Stackelberg 
solution (see, Simaan and Cruz (1973a,b), Ba§ar and Olsder (1982), Ba§ar (1989)) which is 
generally inferior to the (unrestircted) Stackelberg solution for the leader. Here, however, 
we have not imposed a priori the restriction of the feedback Stackelberg solution.
An important implication of the above is that with only stagewise precommitment (or 
instantaneous precommittment, using the terminology of Cohen and Michel (1988)), any pos­
sibility of the policy maker reneging at future stages to better his performance is completely 
ruled out. In other words, with stagewise precommittment, the government’s Stackelberg 
policy (leading to zero inflationary bias) is strategically credible.
7 C o n c lu s io n
In this paper we have provided what we believe to be the first closed form solution to a 
noncertainty equivalent policy problem with rational expectations. Quite generally we have 
stressed that the considereation of the optimal Stackelbergy policy in dynamic models with 
rational expectations necessarily requires that the dual effect of the policy be taken into 
account. In particular the interaction of the policy with the learning process of the private 
sector must be fully recognized. In the case of the monetary policy model first introduced 
by Cukierman and Meltzer (1986), such a policy delivers a zero inflationary bias mimicking 
the corresponding result for the analysis by Barro and Gordon (1983). Another important 
property of the Stackelberg policy here is that with only stagewise precommitment on the 




























































































stagewise precommitment is not there, however, then the incentive for the policy maker to 
renege will always exist in this model, as in static or repeated Stackelberg games. One reason 
for this lies in the fact that private sector is essentially nonstrategic here, since the only role 
given to it is to passively form rationaly expectations. It would therefore be extremely 
important to formulate and study other (stochastic) models which support a strategic role 
for the private sector, and generate endogenous reputational policies as a part of the solution 
process involving a tradeoff between learning and strategic credibility.
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